{"id":12303,"date":"2026-03-31T09:51:53","date_gmt":"2026-03-31T09:51:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/?p=12303"},"modified":"2026-03-31T15:48:13","modified_gmt":"2026-03-31T15:48:13","slug":"before-the-window-closes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/before-the-window-closes\/","title":{"rendered":"Before the Window Closes"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

Bangladesh has a choice between two energy futures. The decisions of the next two to three years will determine which one arrives.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In the weeks after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026, a familiar conversation began in Dhaka. Officials talked about supply diversification. Analysts wrote about strategic storage. Newspapers ran editorials about renewables and offshore exploration. The diagnosis was accurate. The timing was familiar. A version of the same conversation had appeared after the Russia-Ukraine price spike of 2022, when JKM reached $85 per MMBtu and Bangladesh was forced to cut LNG imports by more than 15% against rising demand. Another version had appeared after the gas shortages of 2017 that first made imports feel urgent. Each time, the immediate crisis passed, and the structural changes that would have mattered stayed on the agenda without becoming policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What is different about March 2026 is the scale of what happened, and the narrowness of what remains. Bangladesh cannot easily absorb another crisis of this kind. Emergency spot cargoes at $28.28 per MMBtu, production losses across garment export floors, fuel rationing, university closures: these are not abstractions that another round of well-intentioned targets can address. They are the visible cost of vulnerabilities that have been thoroughly diagnosed and insufficiently acted upon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The question this article addresses is not whether Bangladesh needs to change course. The answer to that is clear. It is what change actually requires, what it would cost, how much time remains to make it, and what the cost of not making it looks like by 2035.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

KEY FINDINGS \u2014 PART 3<\/strong><\/td><\/tr>
The fork<\/strong><\/td>Under business as usual, Bangladesh’s LNG import bill could reach $13.5 billion or more per year by 2035. Under a reform path, it could be held near $4 billion. The gap between those two futures is not a matter of resources or technology. It is policy choices made in the next two to three years.<\/td><\/tr>
The bottleneck as buffer<\/strong><\/td>Two FSRUs running at roughly 95% utilisation constrain import growth through at least 2028. That physical ceiling limits the worst-case trajectory in the near term and creates a window before the next infrastructure wave locks in another decade of dependency.<\/td><\/tr>
What reform actually requires<\/strong><\/td>Five things: resuming offshore exploration in the Bay of Bengal, diversifying LNG supply sources well beyond the Middle East, building 30 to 60 days of strategic storage, accelerating renewables to 20 to 25% of the electricity mix by 2035, and implementing industrial demand-side efficiency standards.<\/td><\/tr>
The renewable gap<\/strong><\/td>Bangladesh has average solar irradiance of 5 kWh per square metre per day, yet renewables account for roughly 4.6% of installed electricity capacity. The cancellation of 31 renewable projects worth $6 billion in late 2024 was a significant setback at the worst possible moment.<\/td><\/tr>
The pattern<\/strong><\/td>A version of the same reform conversation occurred after the 2022 Russia-Ukraine shock. It did not produce structural change. The question the Hormuz crisis poses is whether its scale was finally large enough to produce a different answer.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Where the Road Goes<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Bangladesh’s energy future is not yet written, but the trajectories are becoming legible. The Integrated Energy and Power Master Plan of 2023 projects that LNG could constitute up to 76% of total gas demand by 2040, requiring 30 MTPA of import capacity, four times what the country has today. Achieving that scale would require tens of billions of dollars in new terminals, power plants, and pipeline infrastructure, and would lock in decades of exposure to the same geopolitical risks the Hormuz closure made impossible to ignore. IEEFA has warned that under this trajectory the annual import bill could reach $8.5 billion by FY2029-30 at sustained elevated prices. The IEA projects Bangladesh could become South Asia’s second-largest LNG importer by 2035. Both descriptions are of a country that has chosen volume over resilience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This analysis models three scenarios for Bangladesh’s LNG trajectory through 2035, drawing on Petrobangla production data, IEEFA projections, IEA demand forecasts, and Wood Mackenzie’s LNG pricing scenarios. The three paths are not predictions. They are the range of outcomes that current policy choices make more or less probable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Data note: <\/strong>The scenario cost projections are derived from the authors’ modelling. State this methodology explicitly in the published version. Readers should not interpret the figures as external forecasts unless attributed to a named institution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Base Case assumes moderate growth, limited domestic exploration success, and a gradual but insufficient renewable expansion. LNG imports grow to around 13.5 MTPA by 2035 at a cost of approximately $7.5 billion. Strained but not catastrophic, provided global prices remain moderate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The High Demand scenario assumes industrialisation accelerates but structural reform stalls. Imports surge past 21 MTPA at an annual cost exceeding $13.5 billion. This is the trajectory Bangladesh approaches if renewable deployment stagnates. The interim government’s cancellation of 31 unsolicited renewable energy projects worth approximately $6 billion in late 2024, condemned by Transparency International Bangladesh as sending a “shocking and negative signal”<\/em> to foreign investors, was a significant step in this direction. A version of those projects, tendered competitively this time, will need to come back.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Reform Scenario is different in kind, not just degree. Offshore exploration resumes in earnest. New LNG contracts require geographic diversification. Strategic storage is built. Renewables reach 20 to 25% of the electricity mix by 2035. Under this path, LNG imports peak near 9 MTPA around 2030 and begin declining, with an annual cost settling near $4 billion. The gap between the Reform and High Demand scenarios, roughly $9.5 billion per year by 2035, is the difference between a solvent energy system and a recurring balance-of-payments crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Table 1: Scenario Comparison, Bangladesh LNG to 2035<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Parameter<\/strong><\/td>Base Case<\/strong><\/td>High Demand (No Reform)<\/strong><\/td>Reform Scenario<\/strong><\/td><\/tr><\/thead>
GDP growth assumption<\/td>5 to 6% p.a.<\/td>7 to 8% p.a.<\/td>5 to 7% p.a.<\/td><\/tr>
Domestic gas exploration<\/td>Limited new success<\/td>Continued decline<\/td>Successful offshore finds<\/td><\/tr>
Renewable share by 2035<\/td>~8%<\/td><5%<\/td>20 to 25%<\/td><\/tr>
LNG imports by 2035 (MTPA)<\/td>~13.5<\/td>>21<\/td>~8<\/td><\/tr>
Est. annual import cost by 2035<\/strong><\/td>~$7.5 billion<\/strong><\/td>>$13.5 billion<\/strong><\/td>~$4 billion<\/strong><\/td><\/tr>
Fiscal sustainability<\/strong><\/td>Strained<\/strong><\/td>Crisis<\/strong><\/td>Manageable<\/strong><\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Sources: Authors’ modelling drawing on Petrobangla, IEEFA, IEA, and Wood Mackenzie LNG price scenarios. See methodology note.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 1: LNG import volume and cost under Base Case, High Demand, and Reform Scenario, 2025 to 2035.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Every year of delay narrows the window. The breathing space created by the current infrastructure bottleneck is finite, and the choices made before it closes will shape Bangladesh’s energy costs for the next two decades.”<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

What a Different Future Would Take<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

There is an argument, counterintuitive but worth making, that Bangladesh’s current regasification bottleneck is temporarily useful. With two FSRUs running at approximately 95% of their combined capacity and the Summit second FSRU cancelled, the country’s physical ability to increase LNG imports is constrained through at least 2028. That constraint caps the worst-case expenditure path in the near term and creates a window before the next infrastructure wave. The question is what gets built inside it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The roadmap has five components. They address different dimensions of the vulnerability and are not sequential: they need to happen simultaneously, and at a pace Bangladesh’s energy policy history has rarely managed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reopening the Ground<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The most direct lever is domestic supply. Bangladesh’s maritime boundary rulings against Myanmar in 2012 and India in 2014 gave the country sovereign rights over 118,813 square kilometres of the Bay of Bengal, an exclusive economic zone larger than Bangladesh’s entire land area, sitting above one of South Asia’s most underexplored continental shelves. Progress on licensing has been slow. An offshore bidding round launched in late 2024 attracted limited international interest, partly because BAPEX has no offshore drilling experience and partly because the production-sharing terms on offer were not competitive enough to draw the technical capability the environment requires.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Competitive contract terms, adequate capitalisation of BAPEX for onshore enhanced recovery, and mandatory drilling timelines built into new licences could together add 500 to 1,000 MMcfd of domestic supply within a decade. That would not eliminate the LNG import requirement, but it would meaningfully reduce Bangladesh’s exposure to the price swings and supply disruptions that come with importing at scale from a single geographic corridor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Buying from Somewhere Else<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The March 2026 crisis provided the political argument for supply diversification that analysts had been making for years. The target should be reducing the contracted Middle Eastern share of LNG imports from over 65% today to below 30% within a decade, through long-term agreements with US Gulf Coast exporters, Australian producers, and emerging East African suppliers whose cargoes do not transit the Strait of Hormuz.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Data note: <\/strong>Reconcile the Middle East share figure across all three parts of the series. Part 2 identified Qatar alone at 68 to 75%, with Oman adding further concentration. The ‘65%’ figure here reflects contracted cargoes as a share of total 2025 imports including spot. Verify against Petrobangla RPGCL cargo registry and state the basis clearly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Future SPAs should carry explicit diversification clauses specifying maximum origin-concentration thresholds. The Excelerate Energy contract of November 2023 was a partial step, as Excelerate draws from a global portfolio. But one contract is not a strategy. Bangladesh needs to treat supply concentration as a contractual risk, the way it treats price risk, and build limits into every agreement it signs from this point forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Building a Buffer<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Strategic storage is the measure that would have most directly mitigated the March 2026 shock. Bangladesh entered the Hormuz crisis with zero buffer between its supply contracts and the grid: no underground reserves, no floating storage beyond the two FSRUs fully committed to regasification, and no alternative domestic production to draw on while spot prices moved from $10.73 to $28.28 per MMBtu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An investment of $500 million to $1 billion in underground storage using depleted onshore gas fields, or additional floating storage at Moheshkhali, could provide 30 to 60 days of national gas demand as a shock absorber against future disruptions. For a government under IMF-monitored fiscal pressure, the financing structure matters: the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank have existing Bangladesh energy programmes that could be extended to cover strategic storage infrastructure if a credible plan is presented. The economic case writes itself: emergency cargoes at more than twice the long-term contract rate are considerably more expensive than building the buffer that avoids them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Solar Arithmetic<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Bangladesh has average solar irradiance of approximately 5 kWh per square metre per day, one of the stronger solar resources in South Asia. Yet renewables account for roughly 4.6% of the country’s installed electricity capacity. The government’s Renewable Energy Policy 2025 targets 20% of electricity from renewables by 2030 and 30% by 2040, which are the right destinations. The problem is that the path to them is poorly mapped, and the institutional arrangements make it harder than it needs to be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consider what the LNG import bill implies in solar terms. The money Bangladesh spent on LNG imports between 2018 and 2025 could, at current installed cost benchmarks for utility-scale solar, have financed roughly 22,000 MW of solar capacity. Bangladesh’s total installed electricity capacity today is around 28,000 MW, against peak demand that rarely exceeds 17,000 MW. The comparison is not a direct policy recommendation, because gas and solar serve different roles in a grid and cannot be simply substituted. But it does illustrate how large a resource reallocation is available if policy is aligned to use it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

IEEFA has identified three specific institutional problems that are slowing renewable deployment: the FY2025-26 budget provides no private-sector incentives for renewable investment; new projects lack the implementation agreement clause that makes them bankable; and licensing authority sits with the Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission rather than SREDA, creating a bottleneck that delays every project. Each of those has a specific legislative or regulatory fix. The cancellation of 31 renewable projects worth $6 billion in late 2024 sent a destabilising signal to foreign investors at the worst possible moment. Competitive re-tendering of equivalent capacity is the first test of whether that signal can be corrected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The deployment pathway that avoids land-use conflict in one of the world’s most densely populated countries includes rooftop solar on industrial and commercial buildings, floating solar on the country’s extensive water bodies, and utility-scale development on non-agricultural land corridors. A 20 to 25% renewable electricity share by 2035 is ambitious by Bangladesh’s historical pace. It is achievable if the regulatory friction is cleared and SREDA is given the authority and resources the task requires.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Using Less<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Demand-side efficiency is the least dramatic of the five levers and the one that compounds the effect of the others. Mandatory efficiency standards for industrial machinery, time-of-use pricing that shifts consumption away from peak gas demand hours, smart grid investment that reduces transmission losses, and required energy audits for large consumers collectively offer a 10 to 15% reduction in gas demand over a decade at relatively modest capital cost. Bangladesh’s industrial energy intensity remains high by regional standards. The RMG sector, the country’s largest employer and export earner, also has the greatest scope for efficiency improvement given the scale of its electricity consumption and the age of much of its installed equipment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Table 2: Strategic Pillars for Energy Resilience<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

#<\/strong><\/td>Pillar<\/strong><\/td>Key Actions<\/strong><\/td>Target by 2035<\/strong><\/td><\/tr><\/thead>
1<\/td>Offshore exploration<\/strong><\/td>Competitive Bay of Bengal bidding round with modern PSC terms; BAPEX capitalisation for onshore enhanced recovery; mandatory drilling timelines in new licences<\/td>Additional 500 to 1,000 MMcfd domestic supply<\/td><\/tr>
2<\/td>Supply diversification<\/strong><\/td>Long-term contracts with US Gulf Coast, Australian, and East African exporters; maximum-concentration clauses in all future SPAs<\/td>Middle East contracted share below 30% of total LNG imports<\/td><\/tr>
3<\/td>Strategic storage<\/strong><\/td>Underground storage using depleted onshore fields; floating storage units at Moheshkhali; multilateral development bank financing<\/td>30 to 60 days of national gas demand held in reserve<\/td><\/tr>
4<\/td>Renewable energy<\/strong><\/td>Industrial-scale rooftop solar; floating solar on water bodies; utility-scale development on non-agricultural land; full licensing authority to SREDA; competitive re-tendering of cancelled projects<\/td>20 to 25% renewable share in electricity mix<\/td><\/tr>
5<\/td>Demand management<\/strong><\/td>Mandatory industrial efficiency standards; time-of-use pricing; smart grid investment; required energy audits for large consumers<\/td>10 to 15% reduction in gas demand relative to business as usual<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

The five pillars require simultaneous implementation, coordinated across Petrobangla, BAPEX, SREDA, the Power Division, and the finance ministry. None of them works in isolation.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Figure 2: The gradual reduction of Middle East dependence and growth of diversified sources, renewables, and efficiency savings under the Reform Scenario.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Moment<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Bangladesh has been at this junction before. After the 2022 Russia-Ukraine shock, the diagnosis was the same: too much spot market exposure, too much supply concentration, too little strategic storage, too slow a renewable programme, too little domestic exploration. The immediate crisis passed. Spot prices fell from $85 per MMBtu back to manageable levels. The structural reforms that would have mattered stayed as recommendations in reports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Hormuz closure is different in one important respect: it arrived while Bangladesh was simultaneously navigating IMF programme conditionality, declining foreign exchange reserves, a subsidy bill the government cannot sustain indefinitely, and a power sector with a 61% reserve margin generating idle capacity payments that the budget absorbs without corresponding output. The fiscal pressure that made structural reform feel optional in 2022 makes it unavoidable now. There is no longer a plausible scenario in which Bangladesh absorbs its way through the next decade of LNG price volatility and geographic supply concentration without a structural response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Hormuz crisis also did something the 2022 shock did not: it made the geography of the vulnerability concrete and public. When three suppliers invoke force majeure within five days of each other, all because their cargoes transit the same waterway, the concentration problem stops being a scenario in an analyst’s report and becomes a news event visible to everyone from factory managers to finance ministers. That visibility is a political resource that reform advocates did not have in 2022 and have now.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The choices in the next two to three years will determine whether the Reform Scenario remains available. Two FSRUs at near-maximum capacity constrain the runaway growth of the High Demand path through roughly 2028. That is the window. If the Matarbari land-based terminal reaches a final investment decision during this period, if future LNG contracts embed diversification requirements, if the offshore bidding round attracts competitive participation, and if the cancelled renewable projects are re-tendered and built, then the Reform Scenario’s $4 billion annual import cost by 2035 is within reach. If the window closes without those decisions, the Base Case or worse becomes the default, not through any single failure but through the accumulated weight of inaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The complaint from factory floors in Dhaka and Chittagong used to be about gas pressure. The question the Hormuz crisis raises is what the complaint becomes if Bangladesh follows the High Demand path through to 2035: an energy bill the country’s foreign exchange position cannot service, and a fiscal subsidy system the budget cannot sustain. The difference between that future and the Reform Scenario is specific, calculable, and finite in the time available to choose between them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

About the Series<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This three-part series was produced by Inspira. Part 1 traced how Bangladesh built its structural LNG dependency between 2013 and 2026. Part 2 measured the three structural vulnerabilities the Hormuz crisis exposed. This final article examined the fork ahead. All three parts draw on Petrobangla production data, IEEFA analysis, S&P Global Commodity Insights, and primary reporting from The Daily Star, The Business Standard, Al Jazeera, and Reuters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h1>\n\n\n\n[1]  IEEFA. “Bangladesh’s LNG Dependence Raises Concerns about Energy Resilience.” IEEFA, December 29, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[2]  The Daily Star. “Restive Hormuz Puts Bangladesh’s LNG Lifeline in Peril.” The Daily Star, March 3, 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[3]  Reuters. “Bangladesh Faces Steep Rise in LNG Prices after Qatar Supply Halt.” Reuters, March 6, 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[4]  The Business Standard. “Powering Bangladesh: Redirecting LNG Investments towards Renewable Energy.” TBS, December 30, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[5]  Gas Outlook. “Bangladesh LNG Bill Is No Longer a Stopgap, It’s Structural.” Gas Outlook, March 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[6]  The Business Standard. “Cancellation of 31 Renewable Power Projects Worth $6bn Hurts Investor Confidence: TIB.” TBS, December 24, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[7]  Global Energy Monitor. “Matarbari LNG Terminal.” Global Energy Monitor Wiki.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[8]  Fossil Free Chattogram. Bangladesh LNG Report 2024. Chattogram: Fossil Free Chattogram, 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[9]  Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources. Integrated Energy and Power Master Plan (IEPMP) 2023. Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh, 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[10] IEEFA. “Bangladesh’s Energy Policy Changes Raise More Questions Than They Answer.” IEEFA, June 18, 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[11] Zero Carbon Analytics. “Asian Countries Most at Risk from Oil and Gas Supply Disruptions in Strait of Hormuz.” Zero Carbon Analytics, February 25, 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[12] Wood Mackenzie. “Middle East Conflict Set to Drive Oil and LNG Prices Significantly Higher.” Wood Mackenzie, March 2, 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[13] IEA. “Growth in Global Demand for Natural Gas Is Set to Accelerate in 2026.” International Energy Agency, January 23, 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[14] Transparency International Bangladesh. Generating Power from Renewable Energy in Bangladesh: Challenges in Good Governance and the Way Forward. Dhaka: TIB, December 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[15] Vivoda, Vlado. “LNG Import Diversification and Energy Security in Asia.” Energy Policy 129 (2019): 967-974.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[16] Khandaker, Mahatab. “The Geopolitics of Energy Security in Bangladesh: A Critical Review.” ResearchGate, 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[17] Al Jazeera. “From Pakistan to Egypt, Iran War Drives Up Prices in Global South.” Al Jazeera, March 25, 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[18] The Diplomat. “The Bay of Bengal’s Energy Scramble Has Begun, But Bangladesh Is Late to the Party.” The Diplomat, March 2026.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Bangladesh has a choice between two energy futures. The decisions of the next two to three years will determine which one arrives. In the weeks after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026, a familiar conversation began in Dhaka. Officials talked about supply diversification. Analysts wrote about strategic storage. Newspapers ran editorials about renewables and offshore exploration. The diagnosis was accurate. The timing was familiar. A version of the same conversation had appeared after the Russia-Ukraine price spike of 2022, when JKM reached $85 per MMBtu and Bangladesh was forced to cut LNG imports by more than 15% against rising demand. Another version had appeared after the gas shortages of 2017 that first made imports feel urgent. Each time, the immediate crisis passed, and the structural changes that would have mattered stayed on the agenda without becoming policy. What is different about March 2026 is the scale of what happened, and the narrowness of what remains. Bangladesh cannot easily absorb another crisis of this kind. Emergency spot cargoes at $28.28 per MMBtu, production losses across garment export floors, fuel rationing, university closures: these are not abstractions that another round of well-intentioned targets can address. They are the visible cost of vulnerabilities that have been thoroughly diagnosed and insufficiently acted upon. The question this article addresses is not whether Bangladesh needs to change course. The answer to that is clear. It is what change actually requires, what it would cost, how much time remains to make it, and what the cost of not making it looks like by 2035. KEY FINDINGS \u2014 PART 3 The fork Under business as usual, Bangladesh’s LNG import bill could reach $13.5 billion or more per year by 2035. Under a reform path, it could be held near $4 billion. The gap between those two futures is not a matter of resources or technology. It is policy choices made in the next two to three years. The bottleneck as buffer Two FSRUs running at roughly 95% utilisation constrain import growth through at least 2028. That physical ceiling limits the worst-case trajectory in the near term and creates a window before the next infrastructure wave locks in another decade of dependency. What reform actually requires Five things: resuming offshore exploration in the Bay of Bengal, diversifying LNG supply sources well beyond the Middle East, building 30 to 60 days of strategic storage, accelerating renewables to 20 to 25% of the electricity mix by 2035, and implementing industrial demand-side efficiency standards. The renewable gap Bangladesh has average solar irradiance of 5 kWh per square metre per day, yet renewables account for roughly 4.6% of installed electricity capacity. The cancellation of 31 renewable projects worth $6 billion in late 2024 was a significant setback at the worst possible moment. The pattern A version of the same reform conversation occurred after the 2022 Russia-Ukraine shock. It did not produce structural change. The question the Hormuz crisis poses is whether its scale was finally large enough to produce a different answer. Where the Road Goes Bangladesh’s energy future is not yet written, but the trajectories are becoming legible. The Integrated Energy and Power Master Plan of 2023 projects that LNG could constitute up to 76% of total gas demand by 2040, requiring 30 MTPA of import capacity, four times what the country has today. Achieving that scale would require tens of billions of dollars in new terminals, power plants, and pipeline infrastructure, and would lock in decades of exposure to the same geopolitical risks the Hormuz closure made impossible to ignore. IEEFA has warned that under this trajectory the annual import bill could reach $8.5 billion by FY2029-30 at sustained elevated prices. The IEA projects Bangladesh could become South Asia’s second-largest LNG importer by 2035. Both descriptions are of a country that has chosen volume over resilience. This analysis models three scenarios for Bangladesh’s LNG trajectory through 2035, drawing on Petrobangla production data, IEEFA projections, IEA demand forecasts, and Wood Mackenzie’s LNG pricing scenarios. The three paths are not predictions. They are the range of outcomes that current policy choices make more or less probable. Data note: The scenario cost projections are derived from the authors’ modelling. State this methodology explicitly in the published version. Readers should not interpret the figures as external forecasts unless attributed to a named institution. The Base Case assumes moderate growth, limited domestic exploration success, and a gradual but insufficient renewable expansion. LNG imports grow to around 13.5 MTPA by 2035 at a cost of approximately $7.5 billion. Strained but not catastrophic, provided global prices remain moderate. The High Demand scenario assumes industrialisation accelerates but structural reform stalls. Imports surge past 21 MTPA at an annual cost exceeding $13.5 billion. This is the trajectory Bangladesh approaches if renewable deployment stagnates. The interim government’s cancellation of 31 unsolicited renewable energy projects worth approximately $6 billion in late 2024, condemned by Transparency International Bangladesh as sending a “shocking and negative signal” to foreign investors, was a significant step in this direction. A version of those projects, tendered competitively this time, will need to come back. The Reform Scenario is different in kind, not just degree. Offshore exploration resumes in earnest. New LNG contracts require geographic diversification. Strategic storage is built. Renewables reach 20 to 25% of the electricity mix by 2035. Under this path, LNG imports peak near 9 MTPA around 2030 and begin declining, with an annual cost settling near $4 billion. The gap between the Reform and High Demand scenarios, roughly $9.5 billion per year by 2035, is the difference between a solvent energy system and a recurring balance-of-payments crisis. Table 1: Scenario Comparison, Bangladesh LNG to 2035 Parameter Base Case High Demand (No Reform) Reform Scenario GDP growth assumption 5 to 6% p.a. 7 to 8% p.a. 5 to 7% p.a. Domestic gas exploration Limited new success Continued decline Successful offshore finds Renewable share by 2035 ~8% <5% 20 to 25% LNG imports by 2035 (MTPA) ~13.5 >21 ~8 Est. annual import<\/p>","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":12306,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[247],"tags":[],"ppma_author":[244],"class_list":["post-12303","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-insights"],"yoast_head":"\nBefore the Window Closes | Inspira Advisory and Consulting Ltd.<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Bangladesh has a choice between two energy futures. The decisions of the next two to three years will determine which one arrives.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/before-the-window-closes\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"zh_CN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Before the Window Closes | Inspira Advisory and Consulting Ltd.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Bangladesh has a choice between two energy futures. The decisions of the next two to three years will determine which one arrives.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/before-the-window-closes\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Inspira Advisory and Consulting Ltd.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-03-31T09:51:53+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-03-31T15:48:13+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-31-at-15.31.12-e1774955200796.jpeg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1493\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"744\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Mohammed Salman Rahman\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u4f5c\u8005\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Mohammed Salman Rahman\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"\u9884\u8ba1\u9605\u8bfb\u65f6\u95f4\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"15 \u5206\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Mohammed Salman Rahman\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#\/schema\/person\/72c82ed3983539bce850da07ed3504fb\"},\"headline\":\"Before the Window Closes\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-03-31T09:51:53+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-03-31T15:48:13+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/\"},\"wordCount\":3098,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-31-at-15.31.12-e1774955200796.jpeg\",\"articleSection\":[\"Insights\"],\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/\",\"name\":\"Before the Window Closes | Inspira Advisory and Consulting Ltd.\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-31-at-15.31.12-e1774955200796.jpeg\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-03-31T09:51:53+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-03-31T15:48:13+00:00\",\"description\":\"Bangladesh has a choice between two energy futures. The decisions of the next two to three years will determine which one arrives.\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-31-at-15.31.12-e1774955200796.jpeg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-31-at-15.31.12-e1774955200796.jpeg\",\"width\":1493,\"height\":744},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Before the Window Closes\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/\",\"name\":\"Inspira Advisory & Consulting Ltd.\",\"description\":\"A Gen Y led strategic research firm serving multilateral donors, private sector actors and industry associations\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Inspira Advisory & Consulting Ltd.\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/Full-Color.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/Full-Color.png\",\"width\":701,\"height\":328,\"caption\":\"Inspira Advisory & Consulting Ltd.\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"}},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#\/schema\/person\/72c82ed3983539bce850da07ed3504fb\",\"name\":\"Mohammed Salman Rahman\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"zh-Hans\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/2a7e6efcf8abfa853601aa501b39c746\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-31-at-8.08.19-PM-scaled-e1774966135895.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-31-at-8.08.19-PM-scaled-e1774966135895.png\",\"caption\":\"Mohammed Salman Rahman\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/author\/mohammed-salman-rahman\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Before the Window Closes | Inspira Advisory and Consulting Ltd.","description":"Bangladesh has a choice between two energy futures. The decisions of the next two to three years will determine which one arrives.","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/before-the-window-closes\/","og_locale":"zh_CN","og_type":"article","og_title":"Before the Window Closes | Inspira Advisory and Consulting Ltd.","og_description":"Bangladesh has a choice between two energy futures. The decisions of the next two to three years will determine which one arrives.","og_url":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/before-the-window-closes\/","og_site_name":"Inspira Advisory and Consulting Ltd.","article_published_time":"2026-03-31T09:51:53+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-03-31T15:48:13+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1493,"height":744,"url":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-31-at-15.31.12-e1774955200796.jpeg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Mohammed Salman Rahman","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"\u4f5c\u8005":"Mohammed Salman Rahman","\u9884\u8ba1\u9605\u8bfb\u65f6\u95f4":"15 \u5206"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/"},"author":{"name":"Mohammed Salman Rahman","@id":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#\/schema\/person\/72c82ed3983539bce850da07ed3504fb"},"headline":"Before the Window Closes","datePublished":"2026-03-31T09:51:53+00:00","dateModified":"2026-03-31T15:48:13+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/"},"wordCount":3098,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-31-at-15.31.12-e1774955200796.jpeg","articleSection":["Insights"],"inLanguage":"zh-Hans"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/","url":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/","name":"Before the Window Closes | Inspira Advisory and Consulting Ltd.","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-31-at-15.31.12-e1774955200796.jpeg","datePublished":"2026-03-31T09:51:53+00:00","dateModified":"2026-03-31T15:48:13+00:00","description":"Bangladesh has a choice between two energy futures. The decisions of the next two to three years will determine which one arrives.","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"zh-Hans","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"zh-Hans","@id":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-31-at-15.31.12-e1774955200796.jpeg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-31-at-15.31.12-e1774955200796.jpeg","width":1493,"height":744},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/before-the-window-closes\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Before the Window Closes"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#website","url":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/","name":"Inspira Advisory & Consulting Ltd.","description":"A Gen Y led strategic research firm serving multilateral donors, private sector actors and industry associations","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"zh-Hans"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#organization","name":"Inspira Advisory & Consulting Ltd.","url":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"zh-Hans","@id":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/Full-Color.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/02\/Full-Color.png","width":701,"height":328,"caption":"Inspira Advisory & Consulting Ltd."},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#\/schema\/person\/72c82ed3983539bce850da07ed3504fb","name":"Mohammed Salman Rahman","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"zh-Hans","@id":"https:\/\/inspira-acl-5e9a9a.ingress-baronn.ewp.live\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/2a7e6efcf8abfa853601aa501b39c746","url":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-31-at-8.08.19-PM-scaled-e1774966135895.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-31-at-8.08.19-PM-scaled-e1774966135895.png","caption":"Mohammed Salman Rahman"},"url":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/author\/mohammed-salman-rahman\/"}]}},"authors":[{"term_id":244,"user_id":3,"is_guest":0,"slug":"mohammed-salman-rahman","display_name":"Mohammed Salman Rahman","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-31-at-8.08.19-PM-scaled-e1774966135895.png","url2x":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Screenshot-2026-03-31-at-8.08.19-PM-scaled-e1774966135895.png"},"0":null,"1":"","2":"","3":"","4":"","5":"","6":"","7":"","8":""}],"brizy_media":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12303","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12303"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12303\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12370,"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12303\/revisions\/12370"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12306"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12303"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12303"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12303"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/inspira-bd.com\/zh\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=12303"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}